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I. Introduction
The past year was one of extreme volatility in global financial markets. The first half of the
year began on a solid footing with financial markets stabilizing and recovering from the Asian
crisis that began in October 1997. This relatively stable condition succumbed to a dangerous
decline in the devdoping world in the third quarter, the imposition of capital controls and
repatriation restrictions, and a worldwide decline in markets. Renewed concern erupted over
Asia, led by weakness in the region's financial institutions and attempts by the Latin American
economies to avoid catching the "Asian Flu." Uncertainty led to a flight to quality, causing
large capital outflows from U.S. equity markets and developing country markets and into the
U.S. bond market. The result was a deep, although apparently temporary, decline in U.S.
equity markets. Privatization opportunities expanded as financial realities forced asset divestiture
to raise needed capital. Several countries suspended debt repayment, and flirted either with
total control of currency transactions (Malaysia) or an abrogation of control by pegging their
sovereign currency to a measure outside of their sovereign control (the Euro; Argentina). Also
during 1998, new initiatives to integrate the capital markets and provide a fair opportunity for
international investments in an atmosphere of disclosure and transparency missed an important
deadline.
In this article, we will review: (i) the legal implications in the troubles sovereign borrowers
and financial institutions faced in Asia and, to a lesser extent, in Latin America; (ii) the
successful privatization of the Brazilian telephone in 1998 and the prospects for a significant
increase in privatization activity, particularly asset sales, in 1999; (iii) international initiatives
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to unify investment laws, and reduce bribery and corrupt practices; and (iv) the outlook
for 1999.
II. Troubled Times in International Markets
A. JAPAN
Since the travails of the U.S. savings and loan industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
commentators have noted the impending banking crisis in the developing world and urged
action to address the issue promptly. As with the American crisis, very little was done in
advance of a full-blown crisis, with resulting surprise as major problems were suddenly
revealed.
Japanese banks earned the greatest attention in 1998, as the magnitude of their problems
dwarfed the year's other banking problems.' In November 1998 the Japanese government
allocated sixty trillion yen (about S 500 billion) to bail out their troubled banks. Eighteen trillion
yen was allocated to the bailout of Long Term Credit Bank, which was nationalized on October
23, 1998. On December 13, the Japanese government announced a further takeover, with the
nationalization of the troubled Nippon Credit Bank Ltd. With the takeover, no exit strategy
was announced. Rather, the Japanese government followed actions used by the U.S. government
during its banking crisis to seize troubled banks, continue to run them under government
ownership and supervision, and devise an optimal exit strategy over time. A third institution,
Yasuda Trust & Banking Co., will be dismantled and its assets assumed by healthier institutions.!
Other financial institutions also required public assistance. Seven mortgage lenders went bankrupt
in 1998, requiring six billion yen of public assistance.
B. RussiA
Russia was also responsible for major worldwide upheavals. The greatest cause of difficulty
was the decision by the Russian government on August 17 not to pay debt service on Russian
sovereign debt. Resultantly, Russian banks pleaded force majeure in order to avoid their obliga-
tions to pay debt service. More recently, as the year ended, Russia defaulted on about $26
billion of debts through negotiations with the London Club, an organization representing more
than 600 Western creditors. As the year ended, the Russian bank Vnesheconombank was
asking these creditors to accept approximately thirteen cents on the dollar for a $362 million
payment, which came due on December 2, 1998.'
C. INDONESIA
Indonesia, which was considered one of the greatest risks with respect to the banking crisis,
has made the greatest progress. In fact, Indonesia has established the most prompt method of
asset disposition of any emerging market. Recently, the IMF required the Indonesian government
1. See William Jefferson Clinton's 1999 State of the Union Speech, quoted in State of the Union: Clinton
Outlines His Vition for Nation 's Transtion to the 21st Century, N.Y. Toags, Jan. 20, 1999, at A22. President Clinton
also commented that, "Today much of the world is in recession, with Asia hit especially hard. This is the most
serious financial crisis in a half-century." .Asia has experienced a minor-key replay of the Great Depression."
Paul Krugman, FoaRtuE, Feb. 1, 1999, at 36.
2. SeeJathon Sapsford, Tokyo Takes OverAnother Big Troubedlank, WA.L ST. J., Dec.14, 1998, at Al3.
3. Set Mark Whitehouse, Russia's Debt Crisis Dapens as Country Nears Default on Soviet-Era Obligations,
WA. ST. J., Dec. 22, 1998, at A13.
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to slow the pace of its asset sales in order to obtain better prices. Expect Indonesia to make
rapid progress in asset sales and privatization in 1999. Indonesia is currently seeking bids on
six government firms by April 1999, including port, airport, mining and telecommunications
companies.4 Large-scale sales of domestic banks are also planned.!
D. CHINA
In China, the major news was the dosing of Guangdong International Trust & Investment
Corporation (GITIC), a financial institution created in the Deng Xiaoping era to be one of a
select group of "champions of economic reform."' Of particular interest are the nature of loan
guarantees in China and the application of the Chinese bankruptcy law. Virtually all of GITIC's
foreign borrowing had the approval of the Chinese State Administration of Foreign Exchange.
GITIC itself had guarantees of other ventures outstanding equal to five times its capital in
1997.' While the Bank of China, one of the four large state banks, has been appointed as
administrator of GITIC, foreign creditors were stunned to learn that the Bank of China would
not step in and make good on GITIC's debts.' Under Chinese law, GITIC's 25,000 individual
creditors will get paid from provincial money, while investors will have junior creditor status
under China's bankruptcy law.' While investors often strongly support the types of legal reforms
discussed in this artide, it may come as quite a shock to them in many economies when the
rules begin to be applied as drafted.'0 China has also recently announced a program to sell
troubled loans from its state banks." Such sales may total as much as $240 billion of bad loans,
initially through China Construction Bank.
E. Maxico
In Mexico, FOBAPROA, the state bank rehabilitation agency, has purchased 552 billion
pesos of assets (some $70 billion) from troubled banks. It has been estimated that only thirty
percent of these assets are collectible. The assets were bought with zero-coupon notes that the
banks can present for repayment after ten years. FOBAPROA has yet to sell any assets. Although
FOBAPROA began work to develop an asset sale system, such effort has been put on hold
as the Mexican Congress voted in December to create a new independent Bank Savings Insurance
Institute, with a board approved by the Mexican Senate. The new agency will replace
FOBAPROA which, according to critics, "has lacked transparency and been plagued by favorit-
ism."' 2 Interestingly, the law specifies that the board of the new institute may not include any
officials linked to the bank rescue process from 1995 to 1997, with the result that any knowledge
4. See Indonesia Targets Next Phase of Sala, PiVATrSAT1ON Ir'L, (Prvatisation International Ltd., U.K.)
Dec. 1998, available in Leis, 2ndasy Library, Lglpub File.
5. Id.
6. Cbina. The Skeve Unraveh, ECoNOMisT, Oct. 10, 1998, at 80.
7. Se id
8. See Seth Faisom, Cbina Grows Impatient witb Its Ailing Banks, N.Y. TiMsS, Oct. 8, 1998, at C4.
9. See Mark Landles, Cbina Gives Foreign Cmitoi A Rude 1999 Awakeming, N.Y. TimES, Jan. 12, 1999,
at4.
10. A large parn of the international debt of GITIC was arranged in Hong Kong and had no guarantees
other than letters of comfort from local governments in China. The failure of GITIC points out that investors
often rely on undocumented "guarantees" from quasi-government sources that their lawyers will undoubtedly
encourage them to reassess in light of the recent moves to accountability and the rule of law in foreign investment.
11. See Bloomberg News, China Hopes to Sell Bad Loas at Disaunt, N.Y. Timss, Jan. 5, 1999, at 6.
12. Jonathan Friedland, Mexicm Congres Clean Bank Raee, WAu. ST. J., Dec. 14, 1998, at A14.
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gained during the period will need to be redeveloped. The Mexican banking system also suffers
from a weak bankruptcy law and difficulty in getting prompt and unbiased judicial adjudication
of commercial disputes.
F. SOUTH KOREA
South Korea has forced two of its largest banks to merge. This has created new opportuni-
ties for additional investment in Korea. 3 In December 1998 Lone Star Fund II, a U.S.
real estate investor, won an auction for Korean non-performing loans with a face value of
$474 million. 14 The South Korean banking agency currently holds more than $ 3 billion
of non-performing loans, and has sold loans with a face value of approximately 200 million
to Goldman Sachs, in addition to the sale to Lone Star Fund." The success of this auction
compared favorably with a December attempt by Thailand to sell non-performing loans
with a face value of 510.5 billion, which yielded successful bids on less than ten percent
of the proffered assets.' 6
This has created tremendous opportunities for acquirers. For example, GE Capital, America's
largest non-bank commercial lender, has been on a one-a-month acquisition pace. Its acquisitions
include a big Japanese life insurance firm, Tokyo Mutual, Thai auto and equipment finance
firms and a credit card business, and Philippine Asia Life Assurance. It is projected that they
will spend more than $20 billion in Asia in the next three years.
Of course, no mention of 1998's financial troubles would be complete without a passing
reference to the averted collapse of Long Term Capital Management in the United States.
While no government money was infused into LTCM, the auspices of the Federal Reserve,
the United States' central bank, were used extensively to craft a deal. U.S. involvement in
these types of crises make it more difficult for the United States to argue that other countries
need to reduce their own government involvement in propping up troubled financial players.
III. Currency Controls, Devaluation, and Pegging
Another significant blow to international confidence in investing in emerging markets
came from the Malaysian government which, on September 2, 1998, fixed the exchange
rate between the dollar and the local currency and required a one-year investment in order
to repatriate money offshore from the stock market. 7 This defensive move was the most
extreme of many efforts made or considered by governments seeking to defend troubled
currencies. At year-end, the controls were holding, although there were indications that some
13. Trouble with banks has led to a slowdown in the sale of troubled banks. In late 1997, the Czech finance
ministry was insisting that the four largest Czech banks would be privatized by the end of 1998. This was put
on hold as a result, it is believed, of far greater loan losses than previously disclosed. "These cases (the four banks)
make a mockery of claims from Czech bankers that their loan books are not as bad as they look. Their reports
show that nearly a third of all outstanding loans are delinquent and that provisions and collateral are woefully
insufficient." Czecb Banks. Provisional Problem, EcONOMIST, Jan. 17, 1998, at 70.
14. See Michael Schuman, US. Fund Wins a Crucial Auction of Korean Lom, WA. ST. J., Dec. 22, 1998,
at Al3.
15. See id.
16. See Pichayaporn Utumpom, Investors Snub Thai Bank Agency's Loan Sak, WAu. ST. J., Dec. 17, 1998,
at AI8.
17. See Malaysian Currency ontro Roil Asia Markets, WA.L ST. J., Sept. 3, 1998, at A14.
VOL. 33, NO. 2
BUSINESS REGULATION 235
investors were seeking to negotiate private arrangements with the Malaysian government for
further investment. 18
Chile has been hailed as a model for limiting short-term foreign investment. In 1991, Chile
imposed a requirement that foreign investors deposit thirty percent of all investment in Chile
in a non-interest-paying account with the Chilean central bank for one year.
Chile's method was not to try to prevent outflows (as in Malaysia), but rather to put a tax
on inflows, in an effort to keep foreigners from profiting from high short-term interest rates. 9
According to a study by Sebastian Edwards of the University of California at Los Angeles, as
reported in Business Week, "° the program was successful in shifting the mix of investment in
Chile to long-term funds, which were less affected by the costs of the capital controls. Chile
lifted the controls in September 1998 with very little disruption in its capital markets and
arguably significant success in checking the need to raise interest rates to retain foreign capital.
Others, however, such as Salvador Valdes, a professor of economics at the Catholic University
of Chile, argued that the capital controls in Chile had virtually no effect on the Chilean economy,
since most large Chilean companies could raise money internationally in avoidance of the tax. 21
The year 1998 saw a highly beneficial worldwide discussion about the best way for developing
economies to handle currency fluctuations. Harvard University Professor Jeffrey Sachs received
significant media attention for his work with developing countries in Asia, arguing that IMF
requirements for restrictive monetary policy and high interest rates would destroy the developing
economies.22 Sachs believes that the greatest damper on emerging economies is pegging local
currencies to the dollar23 and that such currencies should be allowed to float freely. Meanwhile,
the International Monetary Fund encouraged the use of currency boards, which tie local currenc-
ies to a fixed peg such as the dollar or the Deutchmark. Some countries, such as Argentina,
have firmly pegged their currencies to the U.S. dollar, eschewing sovereign monetary policy
in order to avoid the high levels of inflation that plagued them early in the decade. Finally,
in the most comprehensive example of such linking, preparations were completed this year for
the launch of the Euro, where the currencies of eleven countries were fixed to a common
standard. These developments suggest a denationalization of monetary policy and further interna-
tionalization of world domestic economies, a prominent trend that we believe will continue
to gain strength in the next few years.
IV. Privatization of Brazil's Telecommunications Sector
One of the largest and most successful privatizations of 1998 was the privatization of Brazil's
state controlled telephone utility Telecomunicacoes Brasileiras S.A. (Telebris). The privatization
of Telebris was the largest privatization in Latin American history.24 In order to set the legal
18. See Douglas Appell, Malaysia May Crack Open A Window to Alkow Foreigners to Take Money Out, WAn.
ST. J., Nov. 16, 1998, at A35.
19. See Stephen Fidler & Andrew Balls, Capital Controls Turbulent Love Affair With International Capital That
Can Bring Pain or Pleasure, FiN. Tiams, Oct. 6, 1998, at 12.
20. See Mike McNamee, How Chile lIced Hot Money, Bus. WK, Jan. 11, 1999, at 34.
21. See Salvador Valdes, Capital Controls in Chile Were a Failure, WAL ST. J., Dec. 11, 1998, at 15.
22. See William Pesek Jr., Quick Cure: Sachs Claims the IMF's Medicine It Killing Patients, B oN's, Oct. 5,
1998, at 23.
23. See id.
24. See Peter C. DuBois, Brazil Rings Up a 64% Premium Over Minimum in Its Auction of Telecom Giant,
BARoN's, Aug. 3, 1998, at MW8.
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framework to successfully privatize Telebris, the Government of Brazil (GOB) during the past
several years enacted various constitutional, legal, and regulatory reforms allowing for private
sector participation in the provision of telecommunication services formerly provided by Tel-
ebris. Through the privatization of Telebris and the related legal reforms designed to, among
other things, promote competition, the GOB hopes to improve and modernize its telecommuni-
cations sector.2
A. LEGAL FRAMEWORK-CREATING CONDrrIONS FOR PRIVATIZATION
1. Structure of the Teecommum taom Sector Prior to Legal Reform
Since the early 1970s Brazil public telecommunications were provided by a group of govern-
ment-owned companies.2 The monopoly consisted of Telebris and its subsidiary Empresa
BrasileiradeTdecomunicacoes A.A. (Embratd). Telebris controlled all ofBrazil's local telephone
operations, while Embratel provided long-distance and international services. The two companies
controlled twenty-seven regional operating subsidiaries, one for each state, which provided all
local, long-distance, and cellular services.
2. Changes to the Legal Framwork for Telecommuncatiom
Between 1994 and 1997 Brazil amended its constitution and passed legislation setting out
the legal framework for privatization of the telecommunications sector. In 1994, the Brazilian
Congress amended the constitution permitting the government and the private sector to consider
actions to restructure Telebras and to move towards a competitive telecommunications system."
In 1995, Constitutional Amendment 8 was adopted, extinguishing the exclusive rights granted
to the state-owned companies for the provision of public services." In 1996, a "minimum
law" on telecommunications was enacted, authorizing concessions for the provision of cellular
telephone services using B Band. 9 In 1997, the General Tdecommunications Law was passed.
Among other things, the law set forth social, economic, and legal principles for the telecommuni-
cations sector, promoting competition and establishing procedures for the privatization of Tel-
ebris.30 The General Telecommunications Law also created a new regulatory body named
Agencia Nacional de Telecomunicacoes (Anatd). These steps provided the legal and normative
framework for the restructuring and privatization of the Brazilian telecommunications sector.
25. Brazil has the eighth largest gross domestic product in the world and a population of 158 million people
and is the largest economy in Latin America. While the telecommunications sector is quite large, it has not
achieved the levels of service and efficiency that the GOB had desired. For example: there are only nine phone
lines for every 100 people in Brazil as compared to 60 or more in the United States and Europe; and in certain
areas customers would wait for up to one year to have a telephone installed. In its desire to improve the delivery
and range of telecommunications services to Brazilians and to effectively compete in a global marketplace, the
GOB decided to privatize Telebris.
26. Sat Aileen A. Pisciotta, Tekmmi=tiam Reform in Brazil 220 N.Y. L. J., Aug. 28 & Sept. 4, 1998,
availabk in LEXIS, 2ndary Library, LgIpub File.
27. See T mmunkitiom in Brazi. Ramaring and Piva , J. Plojvcr Fim., Spring 1998.
28. Sam Pisciotta, supra note 26.
29. Sa id.
30. Law No. 9.472, of July 16, 1997, the General Telecommunications Law.
31. Anatel has independent administrative authority and at the same time it is linked to the Ministry of
Communications, which is controlled by the president. Anatel is made up of two bodies, a five-member board
of directors who serve a five-year term and an advisory board whose members serve a three-year term. The
five-member board is nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate, while the advisory board is
VOL. 3 3, NO. 2
BUSINESS REGULATION 237
B. THE RoAD TO PIUVATIZATION
1. First Steps to Privatization
One of the first major steps to allow private participation in the Brazil telecommunications
sector was taken in 1997 through the auction of the B-band cellular by the GOB services. Ten
licenses for the provision of cellular services in various regions of the country were auctioned.3"
Bidders were allowed to receive up to two licenses, one in the primary markets of the south
and one in the less-developed regions in the north. Bell South, Portugal Telecom, and Spain's
Telefonica were some of the biggest winners in the B-Band auctions.
2. Tekbr& Privatization
In order to facilitate the privatization of Telebris, the GOB began the restructuring of
Telebris in 1997. Prior to restructuring, Telebris was a holding company under which there
were twenty-seven operating companies, one for each state in Brazil. Each of the operating
companies controlled both the fixed telephony and cellular services in its respective state. Under
the restructuring, each operating company first spun off its cellular operations. Then, Telebris
was broken up into twelve separate holding companies: three fixed telephony holding companies,
eight A-Band cellular holding companies, and one long distance holding company. Shareholders
of Telebris received shares in each of the twelve newly created holding companies
Prior to the privatization of Telebris, the government of Brazil owned 19.3 percent of the
total shares of Telebris and held approximately 51.8 percent of the common shares, giving
the GOB control over Telebris. During the auction process, the GOB sold the controlling
interests that it held in each of the twelve holding companies to the winning bidders.
The auctions for the twelve holding companies were held on July 29, 1998, at the Rio de
Janeiro stock exchange. The auctions consisted of sealed bidding, with bidders relying largely
on the GOB's asking price and the results from earlier bids for the B-Band licenses to formulate
their bid amounts. In addition, pursuant to the newly passed General Telecommunications
Law, if bidders were within five percent of each other's offer, the sealed bidding turned into
live bidding. One such case involved MCI and Sprint, which were within five percent of each
other's bid for the long-distance carrier Embratel. In the subsequent live bidding contest, MCI
won but ended up paying 5100 million above its initial sealed offer."
The biggest winner in the auction was Spain's Telefonica, considered the leader in Latin
American telecom, which with its consortium members paid about $4.9 billion for the fixed
line company in Sao Paulo, considered one of the most profitable areas, and 51.15 billion for
a cellular operator in Rio de Janeiro. The other big winners were MCI, which acquired the
long-distance carrier Embratel for 5 2.26 billion, and Portugal Telecom, which acquired a cellular
operator for $3.03 billion. A summary of the results of the Telebris privatization is provided
below.
appointed by the executive and legislative branches. Anatel's function is to issue guidelines for service provision,
execute concession contracts, supervise service rendering, manage the radio frequency spectrum, control and define
tariff reviews, issue norms and standards for equipment, and issue certification of products.
32. The B-Band licenses were designed to promote competition in cellular services by allowing companies
to compete with the A-Band license holders who were already providing cellular services in their relevant markets.
3 3. See Brazil Sels Telbrds; Tedmn Giant Fetcba $18.9B In Largat Latin PrivHanation, SUN-SENrrE., July
30,1998, at ID.
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Privatization Results Chart 4
Operator Winner Winning Price
(US $5)
Telesp Telefonica Consortium 4.9 billion
Tele Centro Sul Solpar 1.75 billion
Tele Norte Leste AG Telecom 2.91 billion
Embratel MCI/Unibanco 2.26 billion
Telesp Celular Portugal Telecom 3.03 billion
Tele Sudeste Celular Telefonica Consortium 1.15 billion
Telemig Celular Telpart 640.68 million
Tele Celular Sul UGB Part./Bitel Part. 593.22 million
(Telecom Italia e Uniao Gobo Bradesco)
Tele Nordeste Celular Telecom Italia e Uniao Globo Bradesco 559.32 million
Tele Leste Celular Telefonica Consortium e Iberdrola 362.71 million
Tele Centro Oeste Celular BID Consortium (Splice do Brasil) 372.88 million
Tele Norte Celular Telpart 159.32 million
In the end, the auctions were successful, as the GOB sold its controlling stakes in the
twelve Telebris subsidiaries for about $19 billion, which was sixty-four percent higher than
the minimum asking price." The timing was excellent for the GOB as virtually immediately
following the auction, the country turned south economically. 6 According to experts, Brazil
has tremendous potential as a telecom market. In the event Brazil emerges from its current
financial challenges, tremendous new investment and privatization is on tap. 7
The Brazilian privatization was notable for its focus not just on receipt of the greatest proceeds,
but also for the desire to promote competition and the establishment of more readily available
phone service in Brazil. To that end, the Brazilians plan to auction four "mirror" license
concessions in order to create direct competition with the winning bidders of the Telebras
companies. 8 The Brazilian government has announced that seventy percent of the value of
the bids for the "mirror" concessions will be evaluated based on the committed investment
that the bidder will guarantee to make in developing the license, and only thirty percent on
34. Se Pl m nernationalAmounces Brazil's Teeommunicatiom Auction Results, Ba .zn. TELEcoM (Global
Information, Inc.) Aug. 1998.
3S. See id.
36. The auction took place on July 29, 1998, at which time the price for the Telebris ADR's trading on
the NYSE was approximately S120. The next day, the ADR's price fell sharply and by early September the price
was below $60. See id.
37. Brazil has become a model for privatization, as ignificant sales of the country's oil and electricity industries
are contemplated. See Darkness and Ligbt in Brazil, ECONOMIST, Feb. 14, 1998, at 33 (describing Brazilian privatiza-
tion efforts for electricity and oil). In the past two years, more than a dozen local energy distributors have been
privatized. Three large generating companies are on the block. Gas is flowing from Bolivia along a $2 billion
pipeline and gas from the new Caisea field in southern Peru may become available. Some believe a single energy
market could be created spanning southern South America. See id. at 34.
38. Jennifer L. Rich, Wbat Happes Next?, LATIN FIN., Sept. 1, 1998, at 29.
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the proceeds offered to the government. This virtually unprecedented move will be watched
eagerly as a potential "new wrinkle" in privatizations worldwide.
The year 1998 was also a strong year for privatization worldwide and in Europe in particular.
Estimates for worldwide privatization topped $1 15 billion." Spain sold its remaining shares in
the bankinggroupArgentaria($2.4 billion), tobacco giant Tabacalera(l .8 5 billion), and the energy
firm Endesa ($7.6 billion). France sold shares in the banking group CIC ($2.2 billion), and two
insurance groups, GAN ($2.9 billion) and CNP ($1 billion). The Italian government raised $7.2
billion for shares of ENI, the Portuguese government garnered $2.5 billion for shares in the electri-
cal utility EP, and the Swiss privatized Swisscom for approximately $6.4 billion. Total transac-
tions for 1998 in Western Europe topped $50 billion, an amount greater than that raised in priva-
tization globally in any year prior to 1993 and two-thirds of the record $75 billion achieved by
Western Europe in 1997.40 It is noteworthy that this strength in privatization is maintained despite
the largely center-left governments that currently dominate Western Europe.
The next great wave in privatization will likely be done on a disaggregated basis as the
troubled assets held by the Asian financial sector are put on the block. A tremendous backlog
of assets are being accumulated in bank guarantee agencies and these assets will need to be
sold off in the coming years. Even more troubled assets are still owned by failed and failing
banks and there will need to be a sale of these assets. This creates tremendous opportunities
for acquirers of distressed assets and the advisors who serve them. 1
V. Efforts to Increase Globalization of Investment and Reduce Bribery
and Corrupt Practices
The year 1998 saw efforts to complete the Multilateral Agreement on Investment fail, despite
the efforts of the twenty-nine members of the Organizati6n for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). In September 1995, negotiators began to work on a rationalization
agreement modeled on the omnibus agreements developed for trade agreements: a set of global
rules, which would replace a patchwork of approximately 1,600 bilateral investment treaties. 2
Although the negotiators set an agreed deadline of April 27, 1998, no action has been taken
as of the date of this artide and further progress is uncertain.43
39. See Mark Baker, Westrn Europe Dominates the World in Priv'tization, AcQuLsmoNs MONTHLY, Dec. 1998,
at 74.
40. Oliver Letwin, Western Europe's Bumper Year, PRIVATISATION INT'L, Jan. 1999, available in 1999
WL8865898, PRVINT database. The Swiss privatization was particularly noteworthy, occurring in October
1998 during the greatest period of market turmoil this year. See id.
41. Other significant privatizations in 1998 included the sale of 20% of Air France. See Bruce Crumley,
Thomas K. Grose & Nina Planck, Privitization-Frnch Styk, TuAs INT'L EDmoN, Mar. 9,1998, at 22. The equity
sale valued Air France at $3.3 billion. See Spanisb Banks, Final Heoings, ECONOMIST, Feb. 7, 1998, at 72 (noting
that the Argentaria privatization was done with a "golden share." This is a fig leaf first used in the British
privatizations of the 1980s and it gives a veneer of nationalism to the decision to sell assets with perceived
nationalistic importance). In Australia, the privatization of 30% of the local telecommunications giant Telstra
resulted in a seismic jump in share ownership to more than 40% of all Australian citizens, up from 17% a decade
ago, creating an economic democracy effect similar to that caused by the British privatizations in the 1980s. The
privatization was followed by privatizations of insurance company AMP and the N.S.W. Totalisator Agency
Board, the state gaming monopoly, that were also strong successes. See Tom Dusevic, Australians Take Stock,
TmE Iirr'L ErrnoN, June 29, 1998, at 46.
42. See Does The WTO NedSpecial Rules for Direct Foreign Investment?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1998, at SI0
[hereinafter Special Rukl]. WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero called the MAI "the constitution for a single
global economy." Douglas Mattem, Democracy or Corporate Ruk, HuMsAsnST, July/Aug. 1998, at 5.
43. See Lori Wallach, Mulinational Madness, TEKuN, May 15, 1998, at 12.
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The need for such rationalization is dear. Problems with the MAI agreement include the
fact that very few developing countries have participated in the drafting of the MAI. According
to some, "the governments of developing countries increasingly see MAI as an exercise in
neo-colonialism, designed to give rich world investors the upper hand." 4 Domestic political
considerations in each country have also led to proposed exemptions to protect favored industries,
labor issues, and the environment, all of which defeat the purpose of an omnibus agreement.
One need only recall the issues faced in the U.S. ratification of NAFTA to understand the
gamut of issues raised by the MAI effort.
Some predict that the MAI will be transferred to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
for completion. The WTO has experience in crafting complicated multilateral agreements, 4'
it involves far more countries than the OECD (132 nations), and it has an adjudication mechanism
for disputes already in place. Predictions are that a final agreement is still years off, ' but the
pressures for such an agreement will increase.47
A number of countries made significant efforts during the year to lure foreign investment by
dropping barriers to foreign ownership and introducing new laws to promote property rights and
freedom of capital. For example, Thailand introduced a new Foreign Investment Law that reversed
the draconian Alien Business Law, allowing foreigners to own up to seventy-five percent of domes-
tic businesses and opening up thirty-three business sectors previously off-limits to non-Thai compa-
nies. New bankruptcy and foreclosure laws were also implemented." In India, efforts were made
to introduce a greater role for foreign investment, particularly in insurance, although a key vote
on opening the insurance industry was deferred in December.4
Efforts to reduce bribery and other corrupt practices were a major initiative of 1998. A
recent U.S. Department of Commerce study revealed that "U.S. companies lost 100 foreign
contracts worth $45 billion to overseas rivals as a result of bribes paid to government officials." 5°
For almost twenty years, the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) has been in effect,
which despite problems in enforcement has gone a long way toward reducing corrupt practices
by members of the U.S. business community.
A major step has been taken by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
through its enactment and soon to be effective anti-bribery statute, similar to the FCPA. Consid-
ered a significant indication of European and international commitment to discourage pervasive
corrupt practices, the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery to Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions is scheduled to go into effect on February 15, 1999. Among other
things, the convention provides a broad definition of bribery and requires signatory nations to
adopt coordinated national legislation to punish instances of bribery paid to foreign public officials.
On December 17, 1997, after ten years of negotiation and much U.S. prodding, representa-
tives of thirty-four nations, including all twenty-nine OECD member countries, as well as
44. Fman ad Ekonomim Te Snaking of tbe MAI, ECONOMWT, Mar. 14, 1998, at 81 [hereinafter Sinking
of the MAI].
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nications, and financial services. Sr Lakr: The Talking FDI Bhws, ECONOMISt, Mar. 14, 1998, at18.
46. Id.
47. See Special Rula, supra note 42.
48. Se Ron Corben, Toiland Make Big Noie About Its Qui Revolution, J. COM. & CoM., Aug. 31, 1998,
at 3A.
49. See Vote on Indian RPm Put Off Unil Neat Year, FiN. Tiats, Dec. 16, 1998, at 8.
50. JBC Intemational, Bribery (by any other name) Is Giving Non-US. Firns Advantage in Global Deals, J.
CoM., Apr. 1, 1998, at IIC.
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Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, and the Slovak Republic, signed the convention. Through
the end of 1998, many signatory nations ratified the convention." It has been suggested that
the new convention may prove more effective than the FCPA, which despite the specter of
onerous sanctions in cases of a wide range of corrupt practices by U.S. business representatives,
has numerous loopholes and problems with enforcement. The most recent statistics available
indicate that a mere eleven cases were investigated between 1994 and 1996, and none of these
were prosecuted by the Department of Justice."
The new convention requires countries to assist each other in their prosecutorial efforts.
There is also built-in enforcement incentive, because each country will have interest in its
counterpart's activities to prevent unfair advantage. It also has been suggested that corporations
may reduce their illegal practices-and take the convention seriously since it has been endorsed
by so many nations.
The World Bank also has made reduction of corrupt practices a priority. For the first time,
anti-corruption language has been added to the bank's procurement guidelines, the rules that
bidding entities must follow to compete for the hundreds of bank projects available. Bank
representatives repeatedly emphasize their commitment to cancel project loans in instances of
bribery or other improper practices. While proving these practices is always difficult, in the
last year, the bank has had a number of instances, several quite publicized, of loan cancellations
or, as they are called, "misprocurements." The bank also instituted a telephone hotline for
callers to call in suspicions of illegal activity. This past year also has seen the issuance of the
first of its kind, new World Bank "Procedures for Dealing with Allegations against Bidders,
Suppliers, Contractors, or Consultants." While the procedures are not as detailed as many
statutory schemes or as many would like, their issuance must be viewed a significant reform.
As with many new rules, there are concerns about enforcement. One of the shortcomings
cited is that the procedures allow the government under review to investigate the alleged
corruption itself, undoubtedly resulting in conflicts of interest. The procedures do, however,
provide that outside investigators and auditors must be requested by the complaining party.
Another source of concern is that investigations are to be conducted according to the laws of
the country in question. Since developing countries may have limited legal and enforcement
mechanisms by international standards, inadequate prosecution may result. As is generally the
concern in cases of this sort, there is the overwhelming evidentiary problem. Bribery is difficult
to prove. Nonetheless, the promulgation of these procedures is an indication of World Bank
commitment to reform. It will be interesting to track investigations and results under the
procedures, and to see the effects. The bank is also preparing a second set of guidelines to
address potential fraud by borrower countries.
Finally, money laundering laws, which are important in international law enforcement, and
the prevention of corrupt practices, became a bit more visible in late December 1998, when
Citibank was subject to formal criticism from the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), the
investigative arm of the U.S. Congress. In a stinging report, the GAO criticized Citibank for
unwittingly assisting Raul Salinas, brother of a former Mexican president, funnel $ 100 million
in alleged illegal drug money from Mexico into bank accounts in Switzerland." The GAO
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concluded that, among other things, Citibank failed to verify the source of the money, did
not investigate irregularities in procedure, and did not follow its own internal procedures against
money laundering. The case is currently under investigation by the U.S. Department ofJustice.
Members of the Senate have expressed strong concern over the inadequacy of bank procedures
to handle problems of this sort. Calls for Senate investigation may be heard in 1999.
VI. Trends for the Future
Predicting the future is undoubtedly one of the greatest of follies. Even Nostradamous appears
to have gotten the trends right, but the dates wrong, so the following is offered with the deepest
humility.
Globalization will continue at a remarkable rate. 4 Uniform securities law disclosure will
receive a substantial drive forward as investors will likely refuse to invest in countries that do
not have open economies." This will parallel increasing efforts at multinational regulation of
banks and other financial institutions. This means a reduction in sovereignty in exchange for
perceived greater financial stability. This has the potential to create civil unrest, however, as
the economic tools of governments will be reduced substantially.
If this internationalization is to be achieved, unification of accounting standards is critical, even
though very few investors to date seem to have been concerned about the lack of transparency in
international accounts and the fact that some accounting systems are a lot more reliable than
others. 6 In 1998, the London-based International Accounting Standards Committee published
a complete set of uniform accounting guidelines. The accounting bodies in both the U.S. and
Japan must approve these rules, however.
With globalization, the friction in the movement of capital between countries will be reduced
substantially, resulting in potential massive, immediate swings of capital in and out of countries
at will. The inability of business to plan for these swings may create significant economic costs
for the industrial sectors of a variety of countries, leading to political instability" and efforts
to reduce the velocity of capital. As with all technology, however, it may be difficult to get
the genie back into the bottle once he has been released. Lawyers will face significant new
challenges in advising their clients through the financial changes that will come and additional
challenges in advising governments how to open their markets and their processes without
disturbing the fragile compact between governments and the people they serve.
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